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Using unique Swedish micro data we examine the impact of local public services on 
community choice. The choice of community is modeled as a choice between a discrete set 
of alternatives. The US literature has produced conflicting evidence with respect to the 
importance of local public services. We find a robust positive (negative) relationship 
between local public services (local income tax rates) and the residential choices of short-
distance migrants (defined as those moving within a local labor market). However, local 
public characteristics are less important for migrants who entered from other local labor 
markets. Using information on subsequent mobility, we also investigate whether the last 
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evidence suggests that this is not the case. 
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1. Introduction 
Since there is no market for local public services, it is not obvious how to estimate 
preferences for these services. In the literature, there exist several approaches to this 
problem. These include the median voter model (e.g., Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973), 
survey data approaches (e.g., Bergstrom et al., 1982), hedonic price models (e.g., Rosen and 
Fullerton, 1977), and discrete choice approaches. There are very few applications of the 
discrete choice approach: Friedman (1981), Quigley (1985), Boije and Dahlberg (1997), and 
Nechyba and Strauss (1998) are the only studies that we know of.  
  The two most well known of these studies, i.e., Quigley (1985) and Nechyba and Strauss 
(1998), arrive at conflicting conclusions with respect to the impact of local public services 
on household community choice. According to Quigley the impact is negative, while 
Nechyba and Strauss find that it is positive.1 However, they also applied widely different 
approaches. Quigley studied a sample of Pittsburgh renter households who had moved 
within the last year; Nechyba and Strauss examined the stock of homeowners residing in 
six New Jersey school districts. The difference in the underlying populations is likely to 
drive the divergence in the results – at least to some extent.2  
  The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the question of the importance of local public 
services for community choice. We do this by using high quality Swedish data for movers 
to the local labor market of Stockholm. 
It is an open question whether one should use the stock of residents or recent movers to 
estimate the demand for local public services. Sizable adjustment costs suggests that 
stayers may be off their demand curve. Migrants, on the other hand, may have preferences 
that are not necessarily representative for the population. Greenwood et al (1991) show 
that the equilibrium assumption inherent in using the stock of residents may result in the 
underestimation of the value of local amenities such as public services. So, in this paper 
                                                 
1 Friedman (1981) concludes that local public services are not very important for residential choice; also, 
there is an “anomaly” in the sense that property tax rates enter positively (and significantly) into the 
equation. Boije and Dahlberg (1997) find that local public services exert a positive influence on community 
choice. 
2 There are other differences between the two studies. Quigley modeled the choice of town, neighborhood, 
and housing as a sequential choice where the town was chosen in the first stage of the decision process. 
Nechyba and Strauss concentrate on the choice of school district. The underlying population in Friedman 
(1981) was the stock of residents in parts of the San Francisco Bay area. The underlying population in Boije 
and Dahlberg (1997) was those who had purchased a house in the local labor market of Stockholm; their 
methodology was similar to Quigley (1985).      2
we focus on movers since if there is a significant relationship between local public services 
and community choice we are most likely to find it in this category. 
  We do, however, consider different categories of movers. In particular, we differentiate 
between individuals who have moved long-distance, defined as a move across local labor 
markets, and those who have moved short-distance, defined as a move within the local 
labor market of Stockholm. Long-distance movers presumably move for very different 
reasons and may lack the information necessary to optimize with respect to local 
amenities. We also provide some evidence on whether the lack of information is an 
important issue by looking at repeat migration in our sample of migrants.  
  Swedish data are very suitable for the purposes of this paper. First, the quality of the 
data is exceptional. Second, local governments comprise a sizable fraction of aggregate 
economic activity in Sweden: in 1992, local government expenditure amounted to around 
27 percent of GDP; by comparison, expenditures at the federal and local level in the US 
amounted to 15 percent (OECD, 1994).3 Third, local governments have important 
responsibilities such as the provision of day care, education, elderly care, and social 
welfare services. Finally, local governments have a large degree of autonomy regarding 
spending, taxing, and borrowing decisions. 
  We have access to a unique individual data set - LINDA; see Edin and Fredriksson 
(2000). LINDA contains the characteristics of a large panel of individuals and is 
representative for the Swedish population. From these data we have selected all 
individuals who moved to a new municipality within the local labor market of Stockholm 
between 1990 and 1991. To these data we match a set of (destination) characteristics of the 
local public sector and other characteristics of the municipality, such as housing.  
  Our results can briefly be summarized as follows. We find a robust positive (negative) 
relationship between local public services (local income tax rates) and the residential 
choices of short-distance migrants. However, local public characteristics are less important 
for migrants who entered from other local labor markets. Although there is more 
secondary mobility among long-distance movers, they do not move more within Stockholm 
relative to short-distance migrants. Thus, lack of information about the characteristics of 
                                                 
3 In 1992, the share of local expenditures in total public expenditures was approximately the same (around 
42 %) in Sweden and the US.   3
the local public sector does not appear to be driving the lower impact of local fiscal 
variables for this group.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the 
econometric framework. In Section 3 we describe the data more thoroughly. Section 4 
presents the results and Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Econometric framework 
In this section we begin by presenting the problem facing an individual deciding in which 
community to reside; then we outline the econometric specification.  
  Consider an individual who is confronted with a discrete set of location alternatives 
(communities) within a local labor market. When maximizing over this discrete set of 
alternatives she takes the attributes of the communities into consideration. In the spirit of 
Tiebout (1956), we mainly have local public services ( c g ) in mind when characterizing the 
attributes of the community (c). We assume that the choice of local labor market has been 
made in a prior stage. Also, we take housing tenure and size choices as given.4 
  The individual, i, has additively separable preferences over the consumption of public 
goods and private goods,  ic x (housing consumption is subsumed into  ic x ). We assume that 
the utility function is given by 
 
  ic c ic c ic g m x z a u e + + + = ) ( ) (   (1) 
 
where  c a  denotes community amenities distinct from local public services. The random 
component of (1),  ic e , captures random preferences for the (c)th alternative. The individual 
budget constraint takes the form 
 
  ic c c i x y r = t - ) 1 (   (2) 
 
where  i y  denotes income,  c r  the price of private goods, and  c t  the local income tax rate. 
Thus, local public services are financed by income taxes.5  
                                                 
4 In the empirical section, we report some evidence on the latter assumption. It turns out that less 
restrictive assumptions regarding housing choices yield only minor changes of the results. 
5 In Sweden, 99.6 % of the taxes raised at the municipal level come from income taxation. Moreover, the 
local tax rate is proportional so there is not much abuse of reality in specifying the left-hand side of (2).     4
  For estimation purposes, we assume that the functions z( ) ￿  and m( ) ￿  in (1) are 
logarithmic. So a stylized version of utility would be  
 
  ic c c c c i ic a g y u e b r b t b b 3 2 1 0 + + + + - + = ln ln ) 1 ln( ln   (3) 
 
We assume that  i y  is determined by choice of local labor market. Since we consider choice 
of community conditional on choice of local labor market,  i y  does not vary by c and can 
hence be ignored. The utility actually observed is the maximum over the set of all 
possibilities and (in principle) the coefficients have the interpretation of marginal 
utilities.6 When estimating the parameters of (3) we will sometimes decompose local 
public service into its component parts.   
Given that the utility observed is the maximum over the set of alternatives and  ic e  is 
i.i.d. with the type I extreme value distribution, McFadden (1973) has shown that the 
probability that individual i chooses community c is given by  
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Equation (4) implies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. The IIA 




We use two categories of data in this study: (i) data on the characteristics of individual 
migrants; and (ii) data on the attributes of the communities. We describe these data in 
turn, beginning with migrants. 
 
3.1 The characteristics of migrants 
Individual data on migrants come from the data base LINDA; see Edin and Fredriksson 
(2000). LINDA is a large panel of individuals, which is representative for the Swedish 
                                                 
6 The simple model outlined here of course implies the restriction  2 1 b b - = . Given that we only have 
approximate measures of local prices, we choose to enter prices and taxes freely throughout.    5
population; it covers around 3 percent of the population. The information in LINDA 
primarily comes from two data sources: filed tax reports and population censuses.  
  From LINDA we extract those 20-65 year olds that moved to a different municipality 
between 1990 and 1991 and where the destination municipality was located in the 
Stockholm labor market. Altogether there were 2,018 such moves; 1,444 moved to another 
municipality within Stockholm (our definition of a short-distance move) and 574 entered 
from another local labor market (our definition of a long-distance move).  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for three categories of individuals; the first 
column gives the means and (where appropriate) the standard deviations for short-
distance movers, the second column presents descriptive statistics for long-distance 
movers, and, for comparative reasons, the last column gives the means and standard 
deviations for those individuals who did not move at all. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: movers and stayers. 






Individual characteristics       
Female  .458  .498  .504 
Age  31.6 (10.1)  30.1 (9.5)  40.9 (12.0) 
Immigrant  .188  .206  .198 
Post high school education  .294  .321  .283 
Earnings (SEK 100)  1,418 (941)  1,000 (862)  1,501 (1,050) 
Employed  .891  .760  .870 
Unemployed  .026  .111  .020 
Welfare recipient  .055  .145  .044 
Subsequent mobility 
 
.369  .466  .174 
Household characteristics       
Size of household  1.44 (.90)  1.33 (.86)  1.99 (1.18) 
Kids £ 15 years of age  .184  .167  .294 
Household earnings (SEK 100)  1,760 (1,335)  1,200 (1,202)  2,335 (1,724) 
House ownership  .253  .340  .369 
Employed family members  .191  .108  .440 
       
# individuals  1,444  574  27,121 
Notes: Except for subsequent mobility, all characteristics refer to 1990. Employed = 1 if individual earnings 
were greater than one basic amount. Unemployed = 1 if the individual received UI or Cash Assistance 
during 1990. Welfare recipient = 1 if the individual received welfare during 1990. Subsequent mobility =1 if 
the individual moved again between 1991 and 1997. Households are defined for tax purposes, i.e., married 
individuals and cohabiting individuals who have children in common are defined as a household. Employed 
family members = 1 if there were employed family members in the household according to the above 
definition. Individuals who did not move house between 1990 and 1991 are defined as stayers. 
 
    Migrants in general tend to be younger than stayers. Moreover, they are members of 
smaller households. The previous labor market history is strikingly different for long-
distance movers compared to short-distance movers and stayers. Long-distance movers   6
earned 40-50 percent less than the other two categories; their employment rates were 11-
13 percentage points lower; and welfare receipt was substantially more prevalent. This 
suggests, of course, that long-distance movers primarily entered Stockholm for labor 
market reasons. Previous work has shown that these two groups exhibit different behavior 
with respect to out-migration; see Westerlund (1995) and Widerstedt (1998) for work on 
Swedish data. In a similar vein, we note that long-distance movers are more likely to 
move again within six years after their original move. In sum, it is probably reasonable to 
estimate separate locational choice equations for long- and short-distance movers. 
 
3.2 Municipal characteristics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the municipalities in the sample. The data has 
been obtained from Statistics Sweden. To avoid simultaneity problems we use 1990 
characteristics throughout. We use expenditure data to proxy for the quality of local public 
services. This is of course unfortunate, but data reflecting the quality of services is very 
seldom available. In fact, we know of no study where community choice has been related 
to the quality of public services. 
Average total expenditure amounts to over 1,500 Million SEK, which corresponds to 
165 Million PPP-adjusted US$ in 1990. Hence, by international standards the Swedish 
local public sector is large. The prime responsibilities of the municipalities are schooling 
and care for children and the elderly. Expenditures on child and elderly care include labor 
costs, rents, and administration costs. With respect to education expenditure, however, we 
are able to exclude rents and administration costs so that this item only includes 
expenditures related to teaching. Panel A of Table 2 shows that, on average, 13 percent of 
expenditure is devoted to teaching at the compulsory level and 32 percent is devoted to 
child and elderly care. The remainder of the local budget (55 percent on average) is 
allocated to culture, parks and recreation, high-school education, administration, and 
assistance programs such as social assistance (welfare) and housing assistance.7   
                                                 
7 Ideally, we would have liked to separate expenditures on high-school education from those included in 
other expenditures. However, 5 out of the 22 municipalities for which we have disaggregate school 
expenditure data do not provide high school education; instead they buy these services from neighboring 
municipalities.    7
Panel B of Table 2 presents local variables as we introduce them in the empirical 
analysis (although we enter some variables in logs). Our general strategy is to measure 
each expenditure item per potential user; total expenditure is measured relative to the 
population, child care expenditure is measured relative to the size of the population aged 
0-6 and so on. For estimation purposes, we note that there is a fair amount of variation in 
local expenditure. The coefficient of variation for the expenditure items ranges from 9 to 
19 percent.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, municipalities. 
  Mean (std.) 
 
A. Expenditure   
Total   1,541,007 (3,454,629) 
Percent of total expenditure devoted to…   
…child care  24 
…education (expenditures on teaching at compulsory level)  13 
…elderly care  8 
…other purposes  55 
   
B. Variables relevant for the empirical analysis   
Total expenditure (per capita)   22.090 (2.690) 
Child care (per individual aged 0-6)   56.188 (9.265) 
Education (expenditures on teaching, per individual aged 7-15)   23.921 (2.266) 
Elderly care (per individual aged 65--)  16.290 (3.136) 
Other purposes (per capita)  12.226 (2.259) 
Municipal tax rates (percent)   14.73 (1.24) 
Social assistance (norm 1)  111.69 (7.50) 
Social assistance (norm 2)  185.77 (9.66) 
House price  1291.115 (447.741) 
Vacant rentals  8.73 (23.61) 
Population size   63,256 (125,843) 
Share of foreign citizens (percent)   8.88 (3.84) 
Municipal unemployment (percent of population age 18-65)  0.60 (0.20) 
# Municipalities  26 
Notes: Expenditures and house prices are expressed in thousands of SEK. The house price used is the 
average price of houses sold in a municipality in 1990. Social assistance (norm 1) is the municipality norm 
for single-person households (in percent of the basic amount). Social assistance (norm 2) is the municipality 
norm for married or cohabiting persons (in percent of the basic amount). Since we know the marital status 
of the households in our data, we can attach the appropriate social norm to each of the observations. This is 
what we have done for the variable “social assistance”, which is the variable we use in the estimations. 
Expenditures on teaching at compulsory level had to be imputed for four municipalities. The imputation 
procedure is described in Appendix A.2. 
 
The bottom half of panel B reports some other characteristics that we will condition on 
in the empirical analysis. These characteristics include welfare generosity, some 
information pertaining to the housing market, population characteristics, and 
unemployment rates.   8
Municipalities are free to determine the generosity of social assistance (welfare); the 
Swedish system is thus similar to the American system in this respect. We report two 
measures of welfare generosity. The first measure (norm 1) pertains to singles, while the 
second (norm 2) pertains to married or cohabiting couples. A feature of our data is that we 
know the marital status of each person in our sample.8 Hence we can assign the norm that 
is of relevance for the particular individual, yielding local and individual variation in 
welfare generosity. This is the approach we take during estimation and we normalize the 
norm by the number of adult members of the household. 
The characteristics of the housing market are summarized by the average price on sold 
houses during 1990 and the number of vacant rental apartments in September of 1990. 
The three major tenure forms in the Swedish housing market are owner occupancy, 
condominiums (coop shares), and renting. These tenure forms accounted for 22, 17, and 47 
percent, respectively, of the total number of apartments in the Stockholm area in 1990. 
The Swedish housing market is far from the idealized competitive one. This is particularly 
true for the rental market, where there are price restrictions and rationing rather than 
prices being determined by supply and demand. Thus, attractive areas feature longer 
queues rather than higher rents; in principle, there should be no price differences for 
dwellings of equal size and quality across the country. To capture the fact that the rental 
market exhibits rationing we use the number of vacant public rentals in the regressions. 
The number of vacancies was extremely low because of the booming housing market in 
1990.  
The bulk of regional price variation within the Stockholm area is due to house prices. 
Market forces essentially determine the prices of non-rental housing. However, there is 
only price information pertaining to owner-occupancy, which is directly relevant for only 
22 percent of the market. Even if we make the assumption that the prices of “coops” are 
proportional to the prices of owner-occupied housing there is still 47 percent of the market 
where the price information is of limited relevance.  
Given that we hold all regional amenities constant, we would like to think about higher 
house prices as a deterrent to entry. However, the assumption that we measure all 
                                                 
8 Notice, though, that households are defined for tax purposes, meaning that cohabiting individuals who 
have children in common are classified as households (together with married individuals). Thus the 
number of cohabiting individuals is underreported in our sample.   9
regional amenities is not particularly realistic. Hence, the sign of house prices is 
ambiguous if there is some capitalization of amenities into prices (see e.g. Yinger, 1982, on 
the idea that local public services and taxes will be capitalized fully into house prices).  
Although the interpretation of the house price variable is problematic, capitalization has 
the virtue that there is less risk of misspecification in the sense that any relevant variable 
that we leave out of the model will to some extent be included if we control for house 
prices.  
We consider two measures to control for population characteristics: population size and 
the share of foreign citizens. The municipalities of the Stockholm labor market vary 
substantially in size. The extreme case is the Stockholm municipality, which is 100 times 
larger than the smallest municipality (Vaxholm) and eight times greater than the second 
largest one. Thus, the largest share of the inflow will enter the Stockholm municipality by 
construction. To avoid these “mechanical” effects we control for population size 
throughout.  
According to Table 1, around 20 percent of movers are foreign-born. In the literature on 
immigrants’ internal migration, it has been shown that they are attracted to localities 
with large fractions of foreigners; see, e.g., Zavodny’s (1998) survey of the US studies and 
Åslund (2000) on Swedish data. Therefore, it is potentially important to control for 
immigrant concentration. In general, of course, immigrant concentration may represent 
an attracting force for some and a repelling force for others.  
The last regional characteristic that we consider is local unemployment. The 
unemployment to population ratio in Stockholm is extremely low in 1990. A long economic 
upturn starting in the beginning of the 1980s peaked around 1990; the aggregate 
unemployment to population ratio stood at 1.4 percent in 1990. If Stockholm truly is one 
single local labor market, then labor market prospects as such should not matter for 
community choice. However, it may still be the case that agents dislike (or like, depending 
on individual characteristics) living in unemployment-ridden communities.  
   10
4. Results 
Having described the data, we now turn to the estimation results. In this section we ask 
questions such as: How important are local public services for choice of community? Does 
the importance vary across different categories of individuals? Why does the response to 
variations in local public services vary across categories? 
  We begin this section by analyzing the determinants of community choice (sections 4.1 
and 4.2). Since we find that the response pattern differs between short- and long-distance 
movers, we proceed to analyze subsequent mobility (section 4.3). If we would find that 
mobility within the Stockholm labor market is greater among long-distance movers this 
would suggest that this category of movers were not able to optimize in the first stage – 
either because of lack of information or restrictions in the housing market.    
 
4.1 Determinants of community choice: Baseline estimates 
Our general strategy is to begin with a bare-bones specification that is consistent with 
equation (4). As we go along we add more sophistication in the sense of adding more 
controls. The baseline estimates are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Logit results for choice of municipality. 








Expenditure (in logs)         
Total  









“Prices” (in logs)         
Tax retention rate 




















Other variables         
Population size (·10

































Pseudo R-squared  0.193  0.196  0.146  0.356 
Log L  -5,308  -5,286  -4,020  -1,203 
# individuals  2,018  2,018  1,444  574 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  
   11
Column I of Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates from a baseline specification, 
including only (the log of) total expenditure, (the log of) the tax retention rate (1 - t), (the 
log of) house prices (as a proxy for r), and population size (to control for the mechanical 
effects of size). The results clearly show that individuals opt for municipalities that offer a 
high level of per capita expenditure given taxes; analogously, individuals move to 
municipalities offering lower tax rates given local public expenditure. In the stylized 
framework of section 2, the ratio of the two coefficients is related to the marginal rate of 
substitution between public and private goods (i.e. net income); according to the estimates 
of column I, agents require an income increase of around 0.19 percent to compensate for a 
reduction of public services of one percent. High house prices do not seem to deter 
individuals from entering a municipality. This result is broadly consistent with the idea 
that regional amenities capitalize into house prices;9 however, it may also reflect the fact 
that we measure a price that is of limited relevance for a substantial fraction of the 
sample. 
  Column II adds a set of other characteristics that are potentially relevant for 
community choice. Local public services and tax rates are still highly significant, but the 
addition of controls shifts the relative importance of local tax rates and local public 
services somewhat. The compensating variation for a reduction of public services by one 
percent is 0.12 percent of net income according to the estimates in column II.  
Most of the coefficients on the additional controls are in line with expectations:  
housing vacancies attract migrants, while poverty stricken areas, as measured by 
unemployment, deter migrants. Welfare generosity enters insignificantly, which is not too 
surprising given that generous welfare benefits may represent incentives for some 
migrants and disincentives to others. What is more surprising, perhaps, is the fact that 
immigrant concentration enters positively and significant. This is due to the fact that the 
foreign-born constitutes close to 20 percent of the sample, and they value immigrant 
concentration positively.10 
                                                 
9 Suppose that local public services and taxes are the only regional amenities and that they are fully 
capitalized into house prices. Then all three coefficients are not simultaneously identified: either the 
coefficients on taxes and public expenditure or the coefficient on house prices would drop out of the 
equation. 
10 For short-distance movers, a simple interaction between immigrant status and the share of foreign 
citizens suggests that the positive coefficient is mostly driven by the foreign born; the coefficient for natives 
is positive but insignificant.   12
  Columns III and IV split the sample into short-distance and long-distance movers. 
While the coefficients on public sector characteristics are well determined for short-
distance movers, this is not the case for long-distance movers. The estimates on local tax 
rates and public services are smaller in size and insignificant in the latter category. The 
sole public sector characteristic that is a significant determinant of community choice for 
long-distance migrants is welfare generosity. This is in line with the observation that 
those who have entered from another labor market are from the lower end of the earnings 
distribution; see Table 1.11 Also, the fact that higher unemployment attracts long-distance 
migrants is an odd feature of these estimates, although the effect is only statistically 
significant at the ten percent significance level.  
  The difference between columns III and IV with respect to public sector characteristics 
may have several explanations. One hypothesis is that the long-distance movers lacked 
the knowledge to make an informed choice with respect to, e.g., public services. Another 
hypothesis is that they had the information, but their primary concern was finding an 
affordable apartment in order to make the move to, e.g., a new job.12 Both of these 
explanations suggest that long-distance movers would move again (within Stockholm) in 
order to correct a sub optimal initial choice. We examine this prediction in detail below.  
  The results in columns III and IV thus imply that in order to get reliable estimates of 
the preferences for local public services one should focus on short-distance migrants. 
Accordingly, we take this approach when examining the determinants of community 
choice further.  
       
                                                 
11 This result is broadly consistent with the US evidence presented in Meyer (1999). Meyer finds a small 
positive coefficient on welfare generosity for single mothers.  
12 This explanation could rationalize the coefficient on the local unemployment rate for long-distance 
movers. In high unemployment communities the housing market is relatively depressed making it easier to 
find an affordable apartment, in particular for individuals at the lower end of the earnings distribution.    13
4.2 Determinants of community choice: Further evidence 
The purpose of this subsection is to present some further evidence on the determinants of 
community choice. The questions we examine are: Do preferences vary with respect to the 
different components of local public services? Do preferences vary by individual 
characteristics? We present the results of some variations of the baseline estimates in 
Table 4.  
  As a preliminary exercise, we test whether preferences differ by expenditure item. For 
that purpose we decompose total expenditure using the first-order approximation:  
 








c m  is the share of expenditure item k in total expenditures. We attach a separate 
coefficient to each item and test the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal by a 
likelihood ratio test. Based on the results from this exercise (not shown), we decisively 
reject the null hypothesis.13 
Since we reject the hypothesis of preference equality, we examine the issue further. We 
introduce each component in logs and measure expenditure relative to the number of 
potential users (see panel B in Table 2 for exact definitions);14 column I gives the results. 
The two most important expenditure items – both in terms of size and significance – are 
education expenditure and expenditure on “other purposes”.  Spending on child and elderly 
care is comparatively less important. 
In columns II and III, we investigate whether preferences for local public services vary 
by income and age.15 In column II, we interact aggregate expenditures and local tax rates 
with earnings; in column III, we introduce similar interactions with age.  
The results in column II suggest that the marginal utility derived from local public 
services is lower among high-income groups; the interaction between income and 
                                                 
13 The test statistic for equality of the coefficients was 10.84 (three degrees of freedom) with an associated 
p-value of 0.013. 
14 This is not an exact decomposition of aggregate expenditures and hence cannot be used for purposes of 
testing. We choose to present the result from this specification as the coefficients are easier to interpret; 
the coefficient directly gives the response to a one percent change in the particular expenditure item. The 
coefficients from the specification implied by the decomposition in equation (5) have the interpretation of 
the response to a one percent change in aggregate expenditure stemming from a particular expenditure 
item.    
15 We have also tried interactions with other background characteristics. For instance, there was no 
significant difference between individuals who had children under the age of 16 and those who had not.   14
aggregate expenditures is negative and significant. This is consistent with the observation 
that municipalities are responsible for sizable welfare programs such as social and 
housing assistance to which the high-earners do not qualify.16 Analogously, high-income 
groups are less prone to enter municipalities where the local tax rate is high. 
 
Table 4: Logit results for choice of municipality. Short-distance movers. 
Variables  I  II  III 
Expenditure (in logs)       
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(.022) 
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(.234) 
   
Other purposes  1.150 
(.313) 
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Pseudo R-squared  0.146  0.147  0.147 
Log L  -4,019  -4,014  -4,012 
# individuals  1,444  1,444  1,444 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
In Figure 1 we graph the compensating variation implied by these estimates. High-
income individuals require a lower increase in net income to compensate for a reduction of 
public services. Notice, though, that there are some extreme cases that distort the picture 
                                                 
16 Indeed, a specification with each expenditure item interacted with income suggests that “other 
purposes” (which includes all the welfare programs) is driving the negative interaction term for aggregate 
expenditure.   15
somewhat. The overwhelming majority of the sample places a positive value of the 
services provided by the local public sector; only 0.3 percent of the sample has a negative 
valuation of public services. Also, the negative compensating variations are not 
significantly different from zero. 
 













Note: The graph plots the percent increase in net income required to compensate for a reduction of public 
services by one percent. The thin lines show the 95 percent confidence interval (calculated using the delta 
method). 
 
The interactions with age in column III suggest a similar pattern, although the 
interaction with the local tax rate is insignificant. If we take the estimates at face value, 
we can transform the interaction estimates in column II and III such that the average 
valuation reflects the age and earnings distribution of the stayer population. The 
difference in the age distribution between the mover and stayer population matters most; 
the age distribution of the stayer population implies an average compensating variation of 
0.10 percent, which should be compared to 0.15 percent for the mover population. 
However, the earnings distributions are so similar that there was not much of a difference 
between the two populations (0.15 % for stayers and 0.16 % for movers).   16
 













Note: The graph plots the percent increase in net income required to compensate for a reduction of each 
expenditure item by one percent. The thin lines show the 95 percent confidence interval (calculated using 
the delta method). 
 
Rather than interacting age with aggregate expenditure, it is perhaps more interesting 
to examine whether the preferences for different kinds of expenditure varies with age. The 
basic results are presented in Figure 2; Table A1 reports the full estimation results. 
The expenditure items with a significant age interaction are childcare and education 
expenditure; for this reason we only plot the compensating variations for these two items. 
Demand for childcare declines with age, while demand for education increases with age. 
These patterns broadly conform to intuition.17 Comparatively young individuals are more 
likely to have children in kindergarten age and so value the increase in childcare 
                                                 
17 That the compensating variation for a reduction in childcare expenditure is negative for individuals 
above 42 years-of-age is a counterintuitive feature of these estimates; also one would expect the 
compensating variation for a reduction of education expenditure to decline with age. Notice in these 
respects that there is good reason to treat the standard errors at the higher end of the age interval with 
more than the usual skepticism as only 20 % of the sample is above age 40. Since we are calculating 
asymptotic standard errors (using the delta method) we are imposing no penalty to having few observations 
at a particular age. Presumably, the variability at the higher end of the interval would be substantially 
greater had we, e.g., calculated the standard errors by means of bootstrapping.    17
expenditures more. Older individuals are more likely to have kids aged 7-15, and, hence, 
have a stronger preference for increases in school expenditure. Notice also that we have 
experimented with more flexible age interactions (we used a quadratic in age) without 
changing the overall flavor of the results.18  
It may also be of interest to compare our estimates for educational expenditures with 
the US estimates in Nechyba and Strauss (1998). The response elasticity with respect to 
education is around 1 in our case; the corresponding number for the US is around 6.19 The 
estimated elasticity is hence six times smaller for Sweden than for the US.20 Of course, 
there might be several explanations for this – one obvious candidate is the difference in 
the underlying populations. However, we would also like to emphasize two of the 
institutional differences between Sweden and the US. First, the years we study feature a 
minimum school quality standard that was implemented by the central government via 
specific grants (the municipalities were free to improve on this standard by increasing 
education expenditure). Effectively, the binding minimum standard eliminates the lower 
tail of the school quality distribution and, given decreasing returns to school quality, the 
marginal utility of an increase in school expenditure may be lower than in a situation 
with no minimum standard.21 Second, the Swedish school system is decidedly more 
egalitarian than the American one; see, e.g., Lindahl (2000). More resources are directed 
towards the less able in Sweden. Therefore, a given variation in education expenditure 
may be less related to variations in the quality of publicly provided education for the 
average individual.  
                                                 
18 All our estimates are based on the IIA-assumption. In principle, this assumption is testable using the test 
developed by Hausman and McFadden (1984). In practice, however, it is far from clear how to implement 
the test procedure – especially when the number of alternatives is as large as 26. The test is based on a set 
of alternative models where one or more of the choice alternatives are left out. In our setting, there 
literally exist an infinite number of possible alternative model specifications. To get a flavor of how well 
specified our models are, we conducted 26 tests of the model with age interactions (see column I in Table 
A1). In these tests, one community at a time was left out. Notice that, on the basis of probability calculus, 
we should expect the model specification to be rejected in 1 or 2 cases at the 5 percent level. In this 
example we rejected the model in 15 out of 26 cases, which suggests that the model may be incorrectly 
specified. Notice also that all models in Nechyba and Strauss (1998) are mis-specified despite their 
contention of the contrary. 
19 The reported elasticity refers to a marginal increase in educational expenditures in the chosen 
community. The elasticity is given by (1 - P)l, where P is the probability of choosing a given community and 
l is the coefficient on school expenditures. For simplicity, we use P = (1/C), where C denotes the number of 
communities, in these calculations. In our case, the estimate is based on column I in Table 4; the US number 
is based on the estimates in Table 3, Model 1, in Nechyba and Strauss. 
20 These results are broadly consistent with the results in Ahlin and Johansson (2001); investigating the 
demand for local public school expenditures using survey data, they find that the income elasticity is 
higher in Sweden than in the US. 
21 Think of a world where parents have preferences defined over their own consumption and the 
consumption of their children. An increase in school expenditure raises the future consumption 
opportunities of children. The marginal utility of public education (for parents) will then be positively 
related to the return to an increase in public education.   18
Our analysis so far is based on the assumption that housing choices are given. What 
happens to the estimates if we relax this assumption? Suppose that we are willing to 
assume that utility is (weakly) separable in housing consumption (h), other private goods 
(x), and public services (g), such that we can solve the maximization problem in stages. 
Suppose further that we can treat housing as a one-dimensional continuous good. Consider 
the optimal choice of housing taking x and g as given. This problem would give housing 
demand function of the form:  ) , , ), 1 ( ( c ic c c i c c g x p y h h t - = , where  c p  denotes the marginal 
price of an additional housing unit. Substituting the housing demand functions back into 
the original utility function we have what is sometimes referred to as a polytomous choice 
model; see Quigley (1976). The upshot of this model is that we should amend the original 
model with net income and a measure of the marginal price of an additional housing unit. 
Notice, though, that the coefficients from this “indirect utility” framework do not have the 
same interpretation as the original ones. For instance, the coefficient on local public 
services no longer reflects the marginal utility of public services but rather the combined 
effect of a change in public services and the induced change in housing consumption. 
Nevertheless, the model is less restrictive and we use it to assess the robustness of our 
results.22  
With respect to public services, the results from the polytomous choice model are 
remarkably similar to the original estimates (the estimates are reported in Table A1). In 
the polytomous choice setting, the coefficient on the log of aggregate expenditures is 2.678 
(standard error: 0.784), which should be compared to our previous estimate of 2.447; c.f. 
col. III in Table 3. The inclusion of individual income (interacted with a set of community 
dummies) reduces the size and significance of the tax retention rate. However, this is 
precisely what one should expect given that local tax rates and income is to some extent 
interchangeable in the regressions.23 The appropriate check is thus to compare the 
coefficient on local public services across specifications. 
 
                                                 
22 This approach is also used by Nechyba and Strauss (1998). 
23 To see this argument, notice that one can always use the local budget constraint,  c c c g y = t  to eliminate 
the tax rate from the model in equation (3). If there is some sorting on income then one should expect that 
the influence of the tax rate is reduced when controlling for individual income.    19
4.3 Is subsequent mobility greater among long-distance migrants? 
The purpose of this section is to examine the patterns of subsequent mobility in the mover 
category. In particular we ask whether there is evidence that long-distance migrants move 
more within Stockholm relative to short-distance migrants in order to correct for sub-
optimal initial choices. 
  The basic idea is the following. The two categories (short- and long-distance movers) 
have received an analogous prior “treatment”, since both categories have moved to a new 
municipality in the Stockholm local labor market. We noted earlier that the response to 
variations in local public services was decidedly lower among long-distance movers; 
compare columns III and IV in Table 3. A natural explanation for this pattern may be that 
long-distance movers either lacked the information, or faced restrictions, such that they 
could not optimize with respect to local public services. More internal mobility for the 
long-distance movers within Stockholm after the initial move would be consistent with 
this hypothesis. 
  To provide some evidence on this issue we have extracted data from the LINDA 
database on the municipalities of residence between 1992 and 1997. Since we observe the 
place of residence only at the 31st of December each year, these data may be thought of as 
grouped duration data. With these data we can estimate the discrete proportional hazard 
associated with subsequent moves. We will only focus on the first subsequent move. We 
begin by sketching the relationship between the proportional hazard for continuous data 
and the proportional hazard for grouped data; Sueyoshi (1995) and Beck et al. (1998) are 
useful references on this topic. 
    Suppose that a Cox proportional hazard model can represent the hazard rate in 
continuous time, i.e.,  
 
  ( ) q l = q l ic ic X t X t exp ) ( ) , , ( 0   (5) 
 
where  ) ( 0 t l  denotes the baseline hazard,  ic X  a vector of independent variables, and q a 
vector of parameters to be estimated. By definition the hazard rate equals 
dt t S d S f ) , ( ln ) ( ) ( ￿ - = ￿ ￿ = l , where  ) ( 1 ) ( ￿ - = ￿ F S  denotes the survival function; therefore,  
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￿ q l - = ‡ = q
t
ic ic ds X s t T X t S
0
) , , ( exp ) Pr( ) , , (   (6) 
 
where T denotes duration. Suppose that we have observed a duration until time  1 - k t  and 
want to ask the question: What is the probability that the duration will stop between time 
points  1 - k t  and  k t ? If  1 =
k it y  denotes the occurrence of this event, we have: 
) , , ( 1 ) 1 Pr( 1 - ‡ q - = = k ic k it t T X t S y
k . Using (5) and (6) we get  
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￿ q l - - = =
- -   (7) 
 
where  } ) ( ln{





t t ds s .24 Equation (7) is a model for a binary dependent variable with 
a “complementary log-log link”. Notice that the baseline hazard is not identified from 
group duration data; only the change in the baseline hazard between successive time 
points is identified.25 
  To be more specific, we will estimate the following general model using pooled cross 
section data with period specific constant terms 
 
  [ ] ) ) ( exp( exp 1 ) 1 Pr( f · + a + g + q - - = = t LDM t LDM X y i i ic i   (8) 
 
where  1 = i LDM  if the individual originally was a long-distance mover and t a vector of 
time dummies. With estimates of  f a g   and   ,   ,  we can test the hypothesis that long-distance 
movers are more likely to move again within Stockholm. 
  In the data there are, of course, moves to municipalities outside Stockholm. Therefore, 
we specify a competing risks type of model, where we treat individuals leaving Stockholm 
as right-censored when estimating the discrete hazard for a move within Stockholm, and 
vice versa. 
   
 
                                                 
24 The derivation in equation (7) is valid also for time-varying Xic so long as Xic (as measured) does not 
change in the interval tk-1 to tk.  
25 Rather than postulating the proportional hazard directly, one might consider working with different 
assumptions about the distribution of  ) ( ) ( t X t Z ic ic a + q = . By definition, the hazard rate in a particular 
interval, k, equals  ))] ( ( 1 /[ )) ( ( ) ( ) , ( t Z F t Z f t t ic ic k - a¢ = ￿ l . The proportional hazard is the result if  ) (t Zic  is 
Type-I extreme value distributed. The standard Logit is the result if  ) (t Zic  is logistically distributed; see 
Sueyoshi (1995). The logit results are very similar to those presented here.   21















Note: The time effect for short-distance movers (SDM) in 1997 is normalized to 0.   
 
 












Note: The time effect for short-distance movers (SDM) in 1997 is normalized to 0. 
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A simple Kaplan-Meier estimator of the hazards for the two groups conveys the basic 
message of the results. The Kaplan-Meier hazards for a move within Stockholm are 
presented in Figure 3, while the hazards for a move outside Stockholm are reported in 
Figure 4. 
As the figures illustrate, long-distance movers are more likely to make yet another 
long-distance move and less likely to move within Stockholm. Thus, there seems to be no 
support for the hypothesis that long-distance movers re-optimize with respect to local 
public services. 
  Table 5 shows some results of the Cox regressions. We first tested whether we could 
impose equality of the baseline hazard for short and long-distance movers (i.e. we tested 
whether  0 = f ); this hypothesis could not be rejected. Columns I and III, therefore, present 
the baseline hazards when we restrict the hazards for long-distance movers to be 
proportional to the one for short-distance movers. Irrespective of destination, the hazards 
are decreasing over time. Thus the risk of subsequent mobility is greatest just after 
having settled in a new place of residence. 
The qualitative nature of these results does not change when we add a set of control 
variables, as shown in columns II and IV. When individual characteristics are controlled 
for, the difference between the two groups is increased (reduced) when it comes to the risk 
of a move within (outside) Stockholm.26 In particular, variables capturing the economic 
status of the individuals do a better job in the equation for moves outside Stockholm. One 
interpretation of this result is that the original group of long-distance movers is a selected 
group that is more vulnerable to economic shocks, implying that they are more likely to be 
subjected to a poor economic outcome and induced to make yet another long-distance 
move. 
 
                                                 
26 We also considered introducing some local characteristics into the equations. The overall flavor of the 
results did not change when we amended the regressions with the same set of local characteristics as in 
column I of Table 3. Still, we formally rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients on the local 
characteristics were jointly zero for moves within Stockholm, although none of the individual coefficients 
had a z-value exceeding 1 in absolute value.   23
Table 5. Discrete hazard results. Competing risks specification. 
  Moves within Stockholm  Moves outside Stockholm 
  I  II  III  IV 
Individual characteristics         
Female    -.137 
(.081) 
  .157 
(.137) 
Age    -.057 
(.028) 
  -.090 
(.046) 
Age squared (·103)    .472 
(.371) 
  .962 
(.598) 
Immigrant    .117 
(.105) 
  -.501 
(.203) 
Post high school education    -.074 
(.085) 
  .003 
(.146) 
Earnings (·103)    -.006 
(.040) 
  -.186 
(.081) 
Unemployed    .152 
(.120) 
  .167 
(.185) 
Welfare recipient    .115 
(.148) 
  .350 
(.213) 
Household size    -.074 
(.085) 
  -.091 
(.072) 








Time effects (1997=0)         











































# non-censored obs  640  640  227  227 
# obs  9,110  9,110  9,110  9,110 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a non-reported constant. Earnings (lagged 
once), unemployed (lagged once), welfare recipient (lagged once), and household size are treated as time-
varying characteristics. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have examined whether individuals are attracted to regions offering a 
more attractive bundle of local public services and income tax rates. We have found a 
robust positive (negative) relationship between local public services (local income tax 
rates) and the residential choices of short-distance migrants. Moreover, we found that 
high-income individuals valued the aggregate basket of public services less than low-
income individuals. This is in line with the observation that Swedish municipalities are 
responsible for important welfare programs to which high-income individuals do not 
qualify. When decomposing aggregate expenditures into its component parts we found   24
that expenditures on education and “other purposes” (including, e.g., recreation and 
transfer programs) were the two most important items.  
The evidence in favor of Tiebout related migration is much weaker – both in terms of 
size and significance – for those who entered from another local labor market. One 
plausible hypothesis tested in the paper is that long-distance movers lacked the 
information or the resources to make the optimal choice with respect to public services; 
after all, they presumably entered the Stockholm labor market mainly for labor market 
reasons. If so, one could expect that they should move again within Stockholm to correct 
for a sub-optimal initial choice. We found no evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Relative 
to short-distance movers, the total rate of subsequent mobility is greater among those who 
originally entered from another local labor market; however, this is only because they 
move out of Stockholm to a greater extent. To us, the evidence suggest that long-distance 
movers are more susceptible to economic shocks; changes in local labor market conditions 
forces them to make yet another long-distance move. 
The fact that results differ depending on the underlying population relates to a wider 
methodological question. Should one base estimates of the average valuation of public 
services on movers or the resident population? There are pros and cons with each choice. 
On the one hand, one can tell plausible stories implying that (short-distance) movers are 
drawn from the upper end of the distribution of the valuation of public services. On the 
other hand, mobility costs may prevent stayers to optimize with respect to public services. 
It seems that the approaches taken in the previous literature is exclusively driven by data 
availability. As far as we know, there has been little systematic research pertaining to 
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Appendix 
 
A1. Additional estimation results 
 
Table A1: Some additional estimates. Short-distance movers. 
Variables  I  II 
Expenditure (in logs)     
Total  
( ) ln(g ) 
  2.678 
(.784) 


































“Prices” (in logs)     
Tax retention rate 






Interaction:  ) 1 ln( t - · (age)   .710 
(.240) 
 
Average house price 





Marginal house price 
( ) ln(p ) 
  67.342 
(35.721) 
Other variables     
Population size (·10





















     
Pseudo R-squared  0.152  0.158 
Log L  -3,989  -3,963 
# individuals  1,444  1,444 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Column I reports the results when each expenditure item is 
interacted with age. Column II reports results from the polytomous choice model. The latter model 
includes interactions between a set of community dummies and individual income. To conserve space we do 
not report the coefficients on these interactions; they are jointly significant, however. The construction of 
the marginal house price is presented in Appendix A2. 
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A.2 Construction of some variables 




Teaching expenditure at the compulsory level ( c E ) was missing for four municipalities. 
For all municipalities, however, there is information about total expenditure at the 
compulsory level ( c T ). For the municipalities with missing observations we applied the 
following imputation procedure. First we calculated the share of total expenditure devoted 
to teaching at the compulsory level:  ) ( c c c T E = g . Then we averaged  c g  for all 
municipalities where this ratio was observed, i.e.,  ) 22 (￿ g = g c c . Finally, we imputed 
teaching expenditures for the communities with missing information as:  c c T E · g = ˆ . 
 
Marginal house price (used in the polytomous choice model) 
The marginal house price for a community is the b-coefficient from the community-
specific regression
 
ic ic c c ic u SIZE p + b + a = ln  
 
where  ic p ln  is the log of the sales price of house i (in SEK) in community c in 1990 and 
ic SIZE  is the size of the house (in square meters). 
The data come from the “Prices of Real Estates 1990” (published by Statistics Sweden. 
This data source contains information about housing characteristics and sales prices for 
all real estate transactions in Sweden in 1990. The sales price is the price according to the 
sales contract, which must be sent to the local court in order to obtain legal confirmation 
of the ownership. The information about the housing characteristics comes from the form 
the homeowner must submit to the tax authorities. 